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This paper tests the influential hypothesis, typically attributed to Friedman (1953), that irrational 
traders will be driven out of financial markets by trading losses. The paper‟s main finding is that 
overconfident currency dealers are not driven out of the market. Traders with extensive experi-
ence are neither more nor less overconfident than their inexperienced colleagues. We first pro-
vide evidence that currency dealers are indeed overconfident, which is notable since they get dai-
ly trading practice and face intense financial incentives to accuracy.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper tests whether imperfect rationality survives in financial markets, an issue that 
is central to the debate between neoclassical and behavioral economics. According to the neo-
classical view, most famously articulated by Friedman (1953), irrational traders will buy assets at 
high prices and sell them low prices and the ensuing trading losses will ultimately drive them out 
of the market. Since extensive evidence now exists for the presence of imperfect rationality in fi-
nancial markets (Hirshleifer (2001) and Daniel et al. (2002) provide surveys), this argument pro-
vides an important justification for maintaining an exclusive focus on rational agents in finance: 
If irrational traders are ultimately forced to leave the market, then imperfect rationality should 
have at most a transient effect on asset prices. Nonetheless, empirical research on this question is 
at best rare and perhaps nonexistent. The evidence presented here suggests that one form of im-
perfect rationality, overconfidence, does survive in financial markets and may in fact be unaf-
fected by trading experience. 
We focus on the world‟s biggest market, the foreign exchange market, and on the agents 
that set the prices in that market, the dealers. We first provide evidence that currency dealers are 
indeed overconfident, on average, as logically required for this investigation. The dealers appear 
to be overconfident in two dimensions: they underestimate uncertainty and they overestimate 
their own abilities, consistent with evidence for other financial-market agents (see, for example, 
Glaser and Weber (2005)). We test whether overconfidence survives the rigors of the market-
place by comparing overconfidence among individuals with differing levels of experience. Our 
results indicate that inexperienced currency dealers are no less overconfident than experienced 
dealers. This robust result holds for both dimensions of overconfidence; it holds whether we 
measure experience by age, years of trading, or rank; and it holds for different types of dealers. 
The literature suggests a number of reasons why overconfidence might survive in finan-
cial markets. Overconfident traders might make more money, either because they take on more 
risk (De Long et al. (1991); Hirshleifer and Luo (2001)), or because (modest) illusions of success   2 
enhance cognitive performance and, thus, the ability to spot profitable trading opportunities 
(Taylor and Brown (1988)). Alternatively, overconfidence may be necessary for survival in this 
market, since it helps motivate dealers to continue trading over the long haul despite inevitable 
trading losses (Oberlechner (2004)). 
Our finding that overconfidence survives among currency traders has potential relevance 
for issues in both international economics and microstructure. At the intersection of those two, 
for example, we find the puzzle of excessive real exchange-rate volatility under floating ex-
change rates (Flood and Rose (1995)). Theoretical work by Odean (1998) shows that overconfi-
dent agents are likely to trade more, and connects this excess trading to excess volatility. Deaves 
et al. (2003) and Glaser and Weber (2007) confirm empirically that overconfident agents do 
trade more than others. The survival of overconfidence among currency traders could also ex-
plain the profitability of trend-following technical strategies in currency markets (Levich and 
Thomas (1993); Dewachter (2001); Dueker and Neely (2007)), since research shows that over-
confidence can be the source of trending and trend reversals (Daniel et al. (1998)). 
The forward bias puzzle – meaning the substantial average risk-adjusted returns one can 
expect from holding high-interest currencies – is another foreign exchange anomaly that may be 
related to the survival of overconfidence. Decades of effort to trace this puzzle to time-varying 
premiums for volatility risk have had at best mixed success (Engel (1996)). An important alter-
native explanation involves imperfect rationality, for which substantial indirect evidence has 
long existed. This evidence, which began to emerge almost three decades ago (Goodman (1979)) 
and has been extensively replicated (MacDonald (2000)), indicates that professional exchange-
rate forecasts are biased, inefficient, and incompatible across horizons. As shown in Han et al. 
(2008), overconfidence could be responsible for the forecasts‟ shortcomings as well as the over-
all inverse relationship between exchange-rate changes and interest differentials. 
When studying the rationality of economic agents it is important to have an objective ba-
sis for choice among the infinitely many potential departures from perfect rationality. Otherwise, 
deviations from rationality could be tailor-made to explain each anomaly, leaving the overall hy-  3 
pothesis of imperfect rationality essentially impossible to disprove. Our objective basis for 
choice is the large body of evidence for overconfidence from the disciplines of psychology and 
economics. Indeed, the widespread human tendency towards overconfidence is one of the 
strongest findings in the psychology of judgment and cognition (Alicke et al. (2001); Lichten-
stein et al. (1977)). The evidence shows that people tend to overestimate the precision of their in-
formation (Lichtenstein et al. (1977); Soll and Klayman (2004)), a tendency labeled “miscalibra-
tion” because perceived probabilities are poorly calibrated to true probabilities. People also tend 
to overestimate their own success (Alicke and Govorun (2005); Camerer and Lovallo (1999); 
Roll (1986)), a tendency often described as “hubris.” According to Alicke et al. (2001), “[t]he 
tendency to view oneself more favorably than the average person is a staple finding in social 
psychology” (pp. 15-16).
1 We are not alone, of course, in relying on evidence from psychology 
to provide a scientific basis for the study of imperfect rationality in financial markets (e.g., Bar-
ber and Odean (2000), (2001); Daniel, Hirschleifer, and Subramanyam (1998); Biais et al. 
(2005)). 
Our sample of North American currency dealers brings several strengths to the analysis 
of imperfect rationality in financial markets. First, it focuses on the agents who actually set pric-
es, rather than amateurs whose influence on the market might be limited. Second, dealers face in-
tense financial incentives to accuracy: dealers‟ annual bonuses, which typically exceed $100,000 
and often exceed $1 million, are largely determined by their personal trading profits, and the 
penalties for losses can include the loss of a job. Third, dealers are experts in their field who get 
daily practice and are provided by their employers with extensive information resources. Finally, 
the age and experience of our dealers vary widely: some are trainees just out of college while 
others have over twenty-five years of experience and have reached the rank of Treasurer. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II, which follows, summarizes the theory and 
evidence relevant to overconfidence and its survival in financial markets. Section III outlines the 
                                                 
1 Other varieties of overconfidence include the illusion of control and unrealistic optimism (Biais et al. (2005); Pres-
son and Benassi (1996); Taylor and Brown (1988)).   4 
structure of the foreign exchange market and describes our data. Section IV provides evidence 
for the two types of overconfidence among currency dealers. Section V provides evidence for 
our main result, that overconfident dealers are not driven out of the market. Section VI con-
cludes. 
II.  OVERCONFIDENCE  AND THE SURVIVAL OF IMPERFECT RATIONALITY 
The existence of overconfidence in human judgment has been studied by psychologists 
for decades (see, for example, Oskamp (1965). Recent surveys can be found in Hoffrage (2004) 
and Alicke and Govorun (2005).
 2 The role of overconfidence has been discussed in such diverse 
fields as medial diagnosis (Berner and Graber (2008)), driving skills (Svenson (1981)) and recall 
predictions of children (Lipko, Dunlosky, and Merriman (2009)). In corporate finance, Roll 
(1986) proposes that corporate M&A decisions are be motivated less by objectively expected 
gains than by managerial hubris, which leads to overpayments for companies. Overconfidence is 
also evidence in CEO and managerial decisions (e.g., Brown and Sarma (2007); John and Dimi-
tris (2007); Malmendier and Tate (2005)), and it appears to be an important reason for excessive 
business entry in both experimental and real-life markets (e.g., Bolger, Pulford, and Colman 
(2008); Camerer and Lovallo (1999)).  
In financial markets, overconfidence has been identified in experimental markets (Biais et 
al. (2005); Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002)) and, through questionnaire studies, among such re-
al-world market participants as defined contribution pension plan members (Bhandari and 
Deaves (2006)), pension-plan decision makers (Gort, Mei, and Siegrist (2008)), individual online 
brokerage investors (Glaser and Weber (2007), (2009)), and financial planners (van de Venter 
and Michayluk (2008)). In addition to the already-mentioned consequences of excess trading, 
high volatility, and momentum effects, overconfidence is a potential source of asset mis-
                                                 
2 While overconfidence has been called “perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment” (DeBondt 
and Thaler, (1995), p. 389), there is some debate as to how to measure it (Juslin and Wennerholm (1999)). For ex-
ample, overconfidence can depend on the response format (see, for example, Cesarini, Sandewall, and Johannesson, 
(2006)). It also matters how items that measure the concept are selected (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinboelting, 
(1991); Juslin, (1994)).   5 
valuations (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001)) and market bubbles 
(Scheinkman and Wei (2003)). Models of overconfidence have shown that miscalibration can 
undermine financial-market efficiency (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998); Odean 
(1998)), an outcome confirmed experimentally by Biais et al. (2005). 
By now, most economists assume that departures from rationality exist in financial mar-
kets. Nonetheless, they are often that these departures compromise financial market performance. 
Even if “investors are irrational …, they [may be] met in the market by rational arbitrageurs who 
eliminate their influences on prices” (Shleifer (2000), p. 2). This argument is often expressed in 
terms of a hypothetical marginal agent: the market will achieve a rational equilibrium so long as 
the marginal agent is rational.
 3 The present study examines whether overconfidence survives 
among the market participants that likely serve as marginal agents. Foreign exchange dealers set 
the price in almost every currency transaction of meaningful size and they speculate with sub-
stantial resources at their disposal. If overconfidence survives within this group then, given limits 
to arbitrage, there may not be sufficient rational marginal agents for the market to achieve and 
maintain efficient prices.  
Skepticism about the survival of imperfect rationality is often based on three apparently 
logical ideas: “(i) that people, through repetition, will learn their way out of biases; (ii) that ex-
perts in a field, such as traders in an investment bank, will make fewer errors; and (iii) that with 
more powerful incentives, the effects [of cognitive biases] disappear” (Barberis and Thaler 
2003). From the relevant evidence, which is mixed, we first review the supportive evidence. 
Consistent with point (i), research shows that, when subjects already have substantial experience 
with financial-market bubbles, such bubbles are less likely to emerge in experimental settings 
(Smith et al. 1988). Consistent with point (ii), it has been found that certain experts – such as 
professional weather forecasters (Murphy and Winkler (1984)) and bridge champions (Keren 
(1987)) – do not display overconfidence. Likewise, List (2003) finds that overconfidence de-
                                                 
3 In the foreign exchange market there is substantial positive-feedback trading, in the presence of which rational ar-
bitrageurs may actually exacerbate departures from the efficient price (De Long et al. (1990b)).   6 
creases with experience to a point where it becomes insignificant among traders of sports memo-
rabilia and collector pins. Incentives, the focus of point (iii), can also make a difference: some 
aspects of preferences can change dramatically between hypothetical settings and settings with 
strong financial incentives (Laury and Holt (2005)). 
There is also a large body of evidence, however, showing that experience, expertise, and 
incentives are usually insufficient to eliminate overconfidence. These studies range from early 
psychological experiments where miscalibration did not differ according to participants‟ exper-
tise (Lichtenstein et a (1977)), to the results of experimental bidding (Allen and Dorla (2005)), to 
a comparison of overconfidence in judgments made by banking and trading professionals, on the 
one hand, and by students, on the other (Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005)), to Chinese broker-
age account data (Chen et al. (2007)). McKenzie, Liersch, and Yaniv (2008) show that infor-
mation technology experts and novices are almost equally overconfident, though experts as well 
as novices wrongly think that experts are less overconfident. Miscalibration has been shown to 
influence judgment even when accuracy is financially rewarded (Fischoff et al. (1977); Sieber 
(1974)). 
Not only is experience typically insufficient to ensure rational perception, but experience 
sometimes undermines rational perception. In an experiment on stock price predictions, for ex-
ample, forecasting accuracy and expertise were inversely related: statisticians made more accu-
rate forecasts than stock market experts and business students were more accurate than business 
teachers (Stael von Holstein (1972)). Similarly, Glaser et al. (2005) find that investment bankers 
are more overconfident than laymen when analyzing financial markets. While counterintuitive, 
this finding can be explained by a phenomenon known as “self-serving attribution,” the tendency 
for people to take credit for successful outcomes and to blame the environment for failures (Mil-
ler and Ross (1975)). With self-serving attribution, overconfidence is not necessarily a static 
state, but instead it may increase with trading success, empirical support for which is reported in 
Jones and Nisbett (1972), Zuckerman (1979), and Statman et al. (2006). This could imply that 
“…it is successful traders … who are the most overconfident. Overconfidence does not make   7 
traders wealthy, but the process of becoming wealthy can make traders overconfident” (Gervais 
and Odean (2001)). 
An inverse relation between accuracy and expertise could also reflect differences in the 
way novices and experts process information (Adelson (1984)). Naïve decision-makers rely on 
fewer cues and make more conservative and constant forecasts than do experts, but the richer 
mental models used by experts can lead to increased scatter (i.e., variation) rather than increased 
accuracy (Yates et al. (1991)). Törngren and Montgomery (2004) find that stock market experts 
base predictions on specific but unreliable information. Likewise, the diagnoses of expert physi-
cians are often affected by non-predictive information (Poses, Cebul et al. (1985)).  
Rich mental representations can lead to higher overconfidence among experts (Mahajan 
(1992)). Bradley (1981) examines the influence of expertise on calibration in the context of ques-
tions that are effectively impossible to answer knowledgeably (and for which correct answers 
were therefore recorded no more frequently than would occur by chance). Though subjects‟ 
claimed expertise was unrelated to correctness, their willingness to admit ignorance was inverse-
ly related to claimed expertise. Indeed, many subjects that claimed expertise failed to admit any 
uncertainty whatsoever even when answering incorrectly. The implications of these results for 
the currency market, where prices are well-approximated as a random walk and the most accu-
rate forecast is usually the no-change forecast, are fulfilled in the evidence presented below. 
Even if individuals don‟t learn their way out of overconfidence, overconfident traders 
could still be driven out of the market by trading losses, since Odean (1998) shows theoretically 
that miscalibration should generate the mistake of excess trading and Barber and Odean (2000, 
2001) show empirically that excess trading reduces profitability. Biais et al. (2005) find a direct 
empirical relation between miscalibration and reduced trading performance. Glaser and Weber 
(2007) find that hubris is also associated with excess trading. There is evidence of excess trading 
in currency markets (Bank for International Settlements (2007); Lyons (1996)). 
Despite these arguments, the finance literature suggests a number of theoretical reasons 
why overconfident agents might survive in financial markets. De Long et al. (1991) argue that   8 
overconfident traders outperform rational traders because overconfident traders underestimate 
risk and hold riskier assets with higher expected returns.
4 In currency markets it has been diffi-
cult to identify any relation between risk and return (Engel (1996)), though recent research iden-
tifying risk with skewness is quite promising (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008)). Kyle 
and Wang (1997) show that overconfident individuals involved in bilateral negotiations can sur-
vive because other participants compete less aggressively. Hirshleifer et al. (2006) show that ir-
rational stock market investors may outperform rational investors when stock prices affect corpo-
rate investment and thus affect fundamentals, but exchange rates are unlikely to have a strong re-
lation to corporate investment. 
The survival of imperfect rationality in the foreign exchange market might more plausibly 
be explained by the analysis of Hirshleifer and Luo (2001), which suggests that the trading strat-
egies of overconfident traders allow them to better exploit the mispricing caused by liquidity and 
noise traders. In addition, Wang (2001) examines which confidence distortions survive when the 
number of imperfectly rational traders is endogenous. He finds that both underconfident and ex-
tremely overconfident agents are driven out, but modestly overconfident traders ultimately dom-
inate in markets, like foreign exchange, with high fundamental volatility (see also Bernardo and 
Welch (2001); Subrahmanyam (2008)). 
Overconfidence may also enhance success through at least four psychological channels. 
First, overconfidence directly enhances mental facility (Greenwald (1980)), and might thus ena-
ble dealers to better identify profitable trading opportunities. Second, overconfidence enhances 
self-esteem, which in turn is associated with teamwork, organizational capabilities, leadership, 
and other qualities that enhance performance beyond profitability (Taylor and Brown (1988)). 
Third, overconfidence may inflate others‟ opinions about oneself (Trivers (1985)): as pointed out 
in Benabou and Tirole (2002, p. 872), “believing ─ rightly or wrongly ─ that one possesses cer-
tain qualities may make it easier to convince others of it.” 
                                                 
4 Though elaborated formally in the economics literature, this connection was initially suggested by psychologists 
(Larwood and Whittaker (1977)).   9 
Fourth, overconfidence fosters persistence, an essential trait for currency dealers (Felson 
1984). Trading can be extremely stressful – active dealers, whose livelihood directly depends on 
their profitability, make losing trades every daily. Benabou and Tirole suggest that “confidence 
in his abilities and efficacy can help the individual undertake more ambitious goals and persist in 
the face of adversity” (2002, p. 872). Dealers concur that high confidence is critical in their pro-
fession. According to one senior trader, “When you are in the trough, you have to come out of it 
very quickly because if you get caught it in, it‟s going to affect you.” According to the trading 
manager a top-ten foreign exchange institution, “if you are not that self-confident, you are not 
going to be a good trader.” This highlights the possibility that currency dealers self select for 
overconfidence or the "sleep-well-at-night" effect: those that can handle the stress sleep well at 
night while those that can‟t handle the stress choose another occupation. 
As this summary indicates, academic research in psychology and economics provides 
theoretical and empirical reasons to take seriously the hypothesis that imperfect rationality will 
be driven out of financial markets. It also provides reasons to take seriously the idea that imper-
fect rationality will survive and possibly even thrive in financial markets. Resolving this issue 
will require direct empirical tests, like those we provide below. 
III.   MARKET  OVERVIEW  AND  DATA 
Trading in the foreign exchange market, the world‟s largest by any measure, averages 
roughly $3.2 trillion per day (Bank for International Settlements (2007)). Wholesale trading 
dominates the market, as indicated by the large transaction sizes: in the electronic interbank mar-
ket, for example, the minimum trade size is $1 million. Foreign exchange dealing banks are in-
volved in almost every significant currency trade. The interdealer market, in which banks trade 
with each other, by itself represents almost half of total trading (Bank for International Settle-
ments (2007)), and the rest of trading almost invariably involves customer-bank transactions. 
Dealing banks stand ready to provide instant liquidity to hedge funds, mutual funds, and other 
asset managers, corporations that buy and sell goods internationally, central banks, and other 
“end-user” institutions. The dealers trade in spot, forward, futures, options, and swap contracts.   10 
A typical dealing room includes salespeople, interbank traders, and proprietary traders. Sales-
people manage the bank‟s relationship with customers. Interbank dealers use the interbank mar-
ket to manage inventory accumulated in customer trades and to speculate. Proprietary traders – 
usually interbank dealers with extensive experience – focus on speculating with the bank‟s own 
funds in foreign exchange and other assets. 
Our analysis of overconfidence is based on the results of a survey distributed on June 25, 
2002 to all foreign exchange dealing banks in North America. North American dealers, in aggre-
gate, account for almost one fifth of world-wide trading (Bank for International Settlements 
(2007)). Of the 1,080 questionnaires sent out, 416 were completed, an overall return rate of 38.5 
percent; this compares favorably with return rates of other surveys of foreign exchange profes-
sionals, which are sometimes in single digits (Cheung and Chinn (2001); Cheung, Chinn and 
Marsh (2004)). In aggregate, the North American dealers in our study have vast trading capacity: 
the sum of their daily position limits is at least $30 billion.
5 
The survey began by assessing a number of personal and professional attributes, from 
which we draw the following portrait of our survey participants (see Table 1). About half of 
them work in New York City, and most work in the spot market. As is true market-wide (Bank 
for International Settlements (2007)), the participants primarily trade U.S. dollars against euro 
and the yen, with smaller concentrations trading U.S. dollars against the Canadian dollar, British 
pound, and Swiss franc; a few trade other currency pairs. Though a majority of our participants 
trade in the interbank market, sizable portions work in sales (32 percent) or serve as proprietary 
traders (20 percent – note that many dealers have multiple functions). Salespeople are on average 
in their late thirties, a few years older than interbank and proprietary traders who are on average 
in their mid-thirties. Over one in five of the salespeople are female, while only one in thirteen in-
terbank and proprietary traders are female; roughly one in ten survey respondents is female. 
                                                 
5 The aggregate limit figure is based on dealer responses when asked to locate their position limit on a list with five 
ranges: $0 -$10 million, $11-$25 million, $26-$50 million, $51-$100 million, and over $100 million.   11 
Since our study focuses on the effects of experience on overconfidence it is essential that 
the dealers in our sample represent a wide range of experience, and they do. The Trainees in our 
sample have spent just over one year on a trading floor, on average and are in their mid-twenties; 
the Junior Traders average four years of trading experience and are typically in their early thir-
ties; the Senior Traders average twelve years of experience and are typically in their late thirties; 
the dealers in the Head Trader/Treasurers category average 17 years of experience and are typi-
cally over forty years old. Across all dealers, years of trading experience ranges up to thirty. 
The use of survey data may be inevitable for analyzing overconfidence, since an individ-
ual‟s attitudes and states of mind can not necessarily be inferred from data on behavior. Indeed, 
one seemingly logical assumption about the connections between overconfidence and behavior 
has recently been belied by evidence. Theory suggests that excess trading stems from miscalibra-
tion (Odean (1998)), but Glaser and Weber (2007) find, when they measure attitudes, that excess 
trading is most closely associated with hubris. Fortunately, research based on survey data has be-
come fairly standard in the analysis of exchange rates (e.g., Frenkel and Froot (1987); MacDon-
ald (2000); Cheung and Chinn (2001), (2004); Menkhoff (2001)). This general acceptance re-
flects, in part, an acknowledgment that carefully structured surveys provide no incentive to dis-
tort the truth. 
It is important to keep in mind why the rationality of experts is rarely tested in finance. 
Investment bankers work extremely long hours, so getting their time is a challenge in itself. The 
high response rate to our survey reflects close research cooperation with participating institutions 
and extensive follow-up efforts. Further, most finance professionals are extremely well-
compensated: established currency dealers can earn millions of dollars and base pay is in six fig-
ures. In consequence, providing them with meaningful financial payoffs is almost out of the 
question for academic research. Fortunately, as discussed previously, existing evidence, as well 
as the evidence presented below, suggests that even with financial incentives for accuracy our re-
sults would be unchanged.   12 
IV.  EXISTENCE OF OVERCONFIDENCE  
This section sets the stage for our main result by providing evidence that currency dealers 
tend towards miscalibration and hubris. 
A.  Miscalibration 
Existing evidence that people overestimate the precision of their information largely 
comes from experiments in which individuals provide ninety-percent confidence intervals for 
general knowledge questions such as “How many miles is it from Paris to Tokyo?” (Lichtenstein 
et al. (1977)). Under perfect rationality, ninety percent of these confidence intervals would con-
tain the correct answer in the experiments, but that fraction is typically below half among exper-
imental subjects (Nofsinger (2007)). Our survey took a similar approach but tailored the ques-
tions to measure financial market accuracy. Each trader was asked to “enter today‟s exchange 
rates of the Euro, the Japanese Yen, the British Pound, the Swiss Franc, and the Canadian Dollar 
against the U.S. Dollar. Then give your personal forecasts of these exchange rates on December 
1, 2002 and on June 1, 2003. For each currency, give your actual FORECAST and the lower and 
the upper LIMIT of a range within which you expect these rates to be with a certainty of 90%.” 
Our main evidence in support of miscalibration comes from analyzing the confidence intervals, 
but we first highlight additional evidence provided by the point forecasts. 
1.   Point Forecasts 
Members of the dealing community assert that traders always have “a view” concerning 
exchange-rate returns at our forecast horizons, and that they take these views very seriously. Ac-
curacy matters because customers often rely on these views and good forecasting increases one‟s 
chance of becoming a proprietary trader (considered a plum job). Nonetheless, academics have 
found, using empirical tests, that major dollar exchange rates are well approximated as a random 
walk without drift, the best forecast for which is simply the current price (Meese and Rogoff 
(1983)). Forecasting exchange rates is thus, in the opinion of most academics, an exercise with 
little better than an even chance of success. Bradley‟s (1981) analysis, described earlier, suggests 
that traders will generally be unwilling to adopt the simple no-change forecast despite the magni-  13 
tude of the forecasting challenge, since they consider themselves to be experts. As this implies, 
virtually none of the point forecasts submitted by our dealers are within a few basis points of the 
current exchange rate. Indeed, less than four percent are within the mean absolute daily ex-
change-rate change (measured over the six months prior to the survey) of that current rate.  
Having a view different from the current rate might be rational for dealers with special 
insights about exchange rates. The dealers most likely to have special insights at our forecast ho-
rizons are the proprietary traders, who regularly keep positions open for a month or more: the ho-
rizons of other traders are shorter. If dealers have special insights, the proprietary traders‟ fore-
casts should be more accurate than current rates. We calculate each proprietary trader‟s forecast 
error, meaning the proportionate difference between his/her forecast and the realized exchange 
rate on December 1 or June 1. We compare these to the proportionate forecast error from the no-
change forecast. Since the surveys were completed on days and at times convenient to the trad-
ers, the “no-change forecast” is different in each case. The proprietary traders‟ root-mean-
squared (RMS) forecast errors exceed those of  the no-change forecast in all but one of the ten 
separate forecast exercises (five currencies, two time horizons), and the differences are statisti-
cally significant in eight cases (Table 2, Panel A). The dealers‟ RMS error is usually over twice 
the RMS error of the no-change forecasts. 
Corresponding results for salespeople and interbank traders are strikingly similar (Table 
2, Panel B). Indeed, the proprietary traders‟ RMS forecast errors are usually statistically indistin-
guishable from those of other traders. Similarly, we find traders at top-tier banks are no more ac-
curate than traders at lower-tier banks, though the former are presumably selected for excellence 
and paid more generously (Table 2, Panel C). Overall, these results suggest that foreign ex-
change dealers overvalue their insights, consistent with results in Bradley (1981). 
2.  Confidence Intervals  
We now test miscalibration using traders' confidence intervals. The standard test involves 
comparing the share of confidence intervals that exclude the correct answer to ten percent, the 
true share under the null hypothesis of no overconfidence. The standard finding is that well over   14 
ten percent of confidence intervals exclude the correct answer, and our dealers provide no excep-
tion. For proprietary traders, 35 percent of December confidence intervals and 71 percent of June 
intervals exclude the realized exchange rate at the end of the forecast horizon (Table 3, Panel A). 
As before, proprietary traders are only slightly more accurate than their colleagues: across all 
traders, 39 percent of the December intervals and 76 percent of the June intervals exclude the re-
alized rate. These results suggest that the dealers in our sample overestimate the precision of 
their information. Further support for this comes from the observation that the fractions for June 
are higher than those for December, since forecasting difficulty certainly rises with forecast hori-
zons and psychologists find that overconfidence rises with task difficulty (e.g., Soll (1996); Pul-
ford and Colman (1997); Dittrich et al. (2005); Lichtenstein et al. (1977)). 
These results, while striking, cannot persuasively demonstrate overconfidence for two 
reasons. First, the point forecasts are not independent: dealers frequently discuss likely future 
currency movements and the commentary they read frequently includes others‟ forecasts. In con-
sequence, the endpoints of each confidence interval are determined in part by the non-
independent point forecasts. Second, exchange-rate volatility over our two forecast horizons 
could have surprised even well-calibrated observers, since rational forecasts are not necessarily 
accurate ones. Suppose, for example, that dealers rationally anticipated average volatility during 
the forecast horizon but realized volatility turned out to be higher than average. In this case their 
confidence intervals would have tended to exclude realized rates, as occurs in our data, despite 
being rationally formed.
6 
For these reasons we adopt an additional approach to evaluating the rationality of dealer 
confidence intervals. Instead of comparing confidence intervals to realized outcomes, we com-
pare the width of the intervals to widths implied by rational volatility forecasts. These rational 
                                                 
6 Multiple tests are appropriate because more pronounced overconfidence has been found with subjective confidence 
intervals (Klayman, Soll et al. 1999). West and Stanovich (1997) find both substantial domain specificity in confi-
dence judgments and general overconfidence mechanisms.   15 
forecasts are calculated based on GARCH models of exchange-rate returns.
7 Since the dealers 
completed the survey sometime between July and October of 2002, the volatility forecast should 
vary according to the specific month in which the forecast was compiled. For each of our five 
exchange rates we create forecasts at horizons of 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10 months, where each 
sample ends in the associated survey-completion month, using historical non-overlapping re-
turns.  This way each end-of-sample conditional variance estimate is our time-horizon-specific 
rational forecast for the conditional variance of that exchange rate over the appropriate forecast 
horizon. From these we calculate the associated ninety-percent confidence intervals that serve as 
our objective basis for comparison with the dealers‟ own intervals using the fact that the ninety-
percent confidence interval for a normal distribution equals approximately 3.29 times the stand-
ard deviation.
 An example may be helpful: to find an objective benchmark for the December 
confidence intervals completed in July, we estimated a GARCH model of non-overlapping four-
month returns where the last observation was July 2002; the benchmark interval width was 3.29 
times the estimated July 2002 standard deviation. 
If our dealers are well-calibrated then about half of their confidence intervals should be 
wider than the GARCH benchmark. Instead, almost all the confidence intervals are narrower 
than the benchmark (Table 3, Panel B). For the proprietary traders‟ December forecasts, between 
88.9 and 99.4 percent of the confidence intervals are too narrow; for their June forecasts, be-
tween 97.8 and 99.7 percent of the confidence intervals are too narrow. Results for all traders are 
similar, as are results for traders at top-tier institutions (Table 3, Panel C). Our qualitative con-
clusion is also unchanged if the unconditional distribution of returns is used to generate confi-
dence intervals, rather than the conditional distribution.
8 
                                                 
7 The data, which come from Datastream, begin in 1970 for EUR, GBP, and CHF, and in 1978 for JPY and CAD. In 
every case we first tried a GARCH(1,1) model. This converged (in Stata) in 32 of 40 cases. If this failed, we tried a 
GARCH(2,2) model (converged in five cases), a GARCH(3,3) model (converged in two cases), and finally an 
ARCH(1) model. 
8 These results, unreported to save space, are available upon request.   16 
Though these figures seem high, it is critical to evaluate their statistical significance. We 
take the null hypothesis to be rationality and we view each trader‟s interval as the outcome of a 
Bernoulli trial in which each confidence interval could be too wide or too narrow with equal 
probability. For each currency, month of survey completion, and forecast date (December, June) 
the number of confidence intervals that are too narrow should thus have a binomial distribution 
with p = 0.5 and n = the number of responding traders (e.g., n = 262 for December 1 forecasts for 
the euro submitted in July). Since our sample sizes are reasonably large and p is not extreme, the 
distribution is well approximated by the normal distribution with mean np and variance np(1-p).  
This bootstrap exercise shows that our results are strongly statistically significant. Mar-
ginal significance levels are below 0.0001 in almost every case. Note that this test is biased in 
favor of the hypothesis of rationality because our estimated “objective” confidence intervals will 
be a bit too narrow. This follows from our assumption that forecasts are compiled at the end of 
each month, which means that the true forecast horizons, and thus the true confidence intervals, 
will in most cases exceed the forecast horizons from which we calculate confidence intervals. 
These tests assume that each survey participant decides the width of his confidence inter-
vals independently from other participants, which seems reasonable because market participants 
rarely discuss confidence interval widths. Nonetheless, we next show that our conclusions hold 
even if the interval widths are not generated independently. To do this we bootstrap the appropri-
ate confidence intervals under the null hypothesis that in each period t, dealer j‟s confidence in-
terval width for currency c at horizon h, CI
j
tch, is determined as the sum of a market-wide com-
ponent, CI
M










tch d CI  . 
To determine the market-wide components we sample (with replacement) 1,000 times 
from our GARCH model‟s fitted values of volatility to create a series of  variances, 
M
tch V , and for 




tch V 29 . 3 . These serve as the common component of everyone‟s confidence-interval width for 
period t. To create the simulated individual confidence interval widths, CI
j
tch, we add idiosyncrat-  17 




, found by sampling (with replacement) from the original differences between 
each dealer‟s (absolute) width and the mean (absolute) width across all dealers submitting fore-




ch-meanwidthch. For each of the 1,000 periods we create n of 
these individual confidence-interval widths, where n again corresponds to the number of dealers 
submitting confidence intervals for currency c for the December or June forecast date in a given 
month. We also create a series of 1,000 “true” variances, V
T
tch, and associated rational confi-




tch V 29 . 3 ,  by sampling a second time (again with replacement) 
from the GARCH model‟s fitted volatilities. 
For each of the 1,000 periods, we calculate the share of simulated individual confidence 
intervals that are narrower than the “true” interval width, CI
T
tch. The distribution of these shares 
represents the true distribution of shares under the null hypothesis that individuals‟ estimated 
confidence interval widths are unbiased but otherwise correlated with each other. We note that 
this test implicitly assumes that estimated and actual confidence interval widths are uncorrelated, 
which we accept because it favors the hypothesis of no overconfidence and because anything 
else would necessarily involve arbitrary assumptions that would make it difficult to interpret the 
results. We carry out this test for surveys completed in July and September, since few were com-
pleted in August and October. 
For the December forecasts the tests indicate that our survey participants tended to be 
significantly overconfident (Table 4): we can reject the null hypothesis at the five percent level 
or better for eight of the ten tests (five currencies, two forecast horizons each), and we can reject 
it at the ten percent level in one additional test. For the June forecasts we reject the null at stand-
ard significance levels in four of the ten cases and in the other cases our failure to reject is often 
due to low power. For example, we cannot statistically reject the joint null for Euro confidence 
intervals for June forecasts submitted in September, even though 100 percent of the dealers‟ own 
intervals were narrower than the GARCH measure. 
This section has provided three types of evidence indicating that currency traders tend to 
overestimate the precision of their information. When forecasting exchange rates they choose not   18 
to rely on the current rate, even though that rate would be more accurate than their own forecasts; 
their ninety-percent confidence intervals exclude the realized exchange rate in far more than ten 
percent of cases; and their ninety-percent confidence intervals tend to be wider than “rational” 
confidence intervals, meaning those based on econometric forecasts of conditional volatility. We 
next provide evidence that dealers also tend to overrate their personal success. 
B.   Hubris 
Our tests for hubris are based on responses to the following question: “How successful do 
you see yourself as a foreign exchange trader?” The top rank of 7 was assigned to “Much more 
successful than other foreign exchange traders;” the bottom rank of 1 was assigned to “Much less 
successful than other foreign exchange traders”; “Average” was assigned to the middle rank of 4. 
All categories of the seven-step rating scale were individually labeled.  
We also asked the participants‟ immediate superiors (i.e., head traders or chief dealers) to 
rate their subordinates. The superiors were specifically instructed to compare individuals to oth-
ers with similar responsibilities at the same institutional rank, since such specificity is shown in 
the organizational literature to increase discriminative ratings and to reduce judgment errors 
among supervisors (Locklear, Granger, and Veres (1989)).
9  The superiors rated their subordi-
nates along three dimensions: “overall contribution to the organization,” “trading profits,” and 
“trading potential.” Traders‟ overall contributions to the organization were comprehensively de-
fined to include trading profits and broader factors such as the support of other traders and the 
completion of tasks for the whole group (Borman and Motowidlo (1993)). Overall Contribution 
thus matches the overall success rating requested of the traders themselves. Trading Profits is 
self-explanatory. Trading Potential was defined as the degree to which traders have the personal 
making of successful traders in their trading area; head traders were specifically instructed to 
separate trading potential from realized profits. The three ratings are highly correlated, with bi-
lateral correlation coefficients ranging from 0.58 to 0.72. 
                                                 
9 For example, without position-specific standards, supervisors may show an unwanted tendency to rate workers bet-
ter the higher their rank (Brandstätter 1970).   19 
Our currency market professionals give themselves an average rank of 5.06, or “better 
than average,” with standard error of 0.05 (Table 5). This suggests overconfidence, as does the 
related observation that three quarters of traders perceive themselves as more successful than av-
erage, a fraction that is, of course, statistically unlikely to be accurate. Indeed, roughly fourteen 
times as many dealers perceive themselves above average as perceive themselves below average. 
Of course, most of our dealers work at top tier institutions, where trading skill could well 
be above average. If this explains our result, then traders at lower tier institutions should general-
ly rate themselves below average. However, the fraction of traders at lower tier banks rating 
themselves above average is only a bit lower than the fraction at top tier banks. As noted earlier, 
this is consistent with existing evidence. Svenson (1981), for example, finds that 93 percent of 
participating U.S. college students consider themselves better-than-average as a driver. The re-
sult is notable because currency dealers potentially serve as the marginal agent in the foreign ex-
change market and because they have strong incentives to overcome perceptual biases. 
To evaluate the statistical significance of these results we undertake a bootstrap test of the 
null hypothesis of no hubris, taking the superiors‟ ratings to represent the true distribution of rat-
ings within rank and responsibility classes.
10 This evaluation is necessarily limited, since only 
two of the twelve rank-responsibility combinations include sufficient individuals to generate a 
meaningfully powerful test. These two categories are senior interbank traders, with 78 individu-
als, and senior salespeople, with 94 individuals. Fortunately, these two groups together include 
70 percent of the total sample with matched ratings. 
Our goal is to calculate the likelihood of observing a given fraction of self-proclaimed 
above-average traders within a given rank-responsibility category under the null hypothesis of no 
overconfidence. We create 1,000 sets of k ratings, where k is the number of individuals in that 
rank-responsibility category with ratings from their superior as well as themselves. Each rating is 
drawn at random (with replacement) from the sample of superiors‟ ratings. For each set of simu-
                                                 
10 Note: The test does not assume that superiors correctly rated individual traders. It makes the less restrictive as-
sumption that the distribution of ratings by superiors accurately portrays the distribution of true ratings.   20 
lated ratings we calculate the fraction of above-average ratings. For each rating category this 
gives us 1,000 fractions, one from each set, the distribution of which we compare with the corre-
sponding fraction from our k survey participants in that category. If an observed fraction is more 
extreme than 95 percent of the 1,000 corresponding fractions in the simulated data, we reject the 
null of no hubris. Note that the tests are biased towards accepting the null, since the supervisors 
themselves tended to rate their subordinates better-than-average. Average supervisors' ratings 
(standard errors) are 4.6 (0.09), 4.5 (0.09), and 4.9 (0.08) for the Overall Contribution, Trading 
Profits, and Trading Potential dimensions, respectively. 
The tests reject the null hypothesis of no overconfidence with great statistical significance 
(Table 6). In our baseline test, which uses the Overall Contribution rating by superiors, none of 
the 1,000 sets of simulated ratings had a share of above-average senior interbank traders as high 
as the observed share of 77.7; indeed, the highest simulated share was only 66.2. Similarly, not 
one of the sets of simulated ratings had a share of below-average interbank traders as low as the 
observed fraction of 5.6; the lowest simulated share was 6.5. Our conclusions are not changed if 
the superiors' ratings for Trading Profitability or Trading Potential replace their ratings for Over-
all Contribution. 
V.   SURVIVAL OF OVERCONFIDENCE 
Having presented evidence that foreign exchange dealers tend to be overconfident, we 
can now examine the paper‟s central question: Is overconfidence driven out of the foreign ex-
change market? This could occur if individual dealers become correctly calibrated over time, 
given frequent feedback and strong incentives for accuracy. It could alternatively occur if over-
confident dealers are fired or choose another profession, so that only rational dealers remain in 
the profession. The evidence presented in this section indicates that overconfident dealers are not 
driven out of the market. 
To examine this issue we need measures of each individual’s overconfidence. Our meas-
ure of miscalibration focuses on the extent to which a dealer‟s confidence intervals fall short of 
their value under rationality, taking the rational value to be the width calculated from our   21 
GARCH analysis. We first calculate the ratio between the width of each confidence interval and 
the appropriate width. As before, since the dealers submitted their surveys in either July, August, 
September, or October so we have four horizons each for the December and January forecast. 








ch is the 
dealer‟s chosen width and w
G
ch is the GARCH-based width. Each dealer provided up to ten con-
fidence intervals (five currencies each for the December and June forecasts), so we take the aver-
age of the ratios, R
i,. Dealer i‟s miscalibration, M
i, is then defined as the gap between unity and 
this average: M
i ≡ 1- R
i. For well-calibrated individuals this measure is zero; for overconfident 
individuals it ranges upwards to a maximum of one.
11 
To measure each trader‟s hubris we compare the trader‟s rating of his/her own perfor-
mance, P
i








 12 For 
agents who are not overconfident this will be zero; like miscalibration, H
i rises with overconfi-
dence. Note that this measure is not available for lower-tier banks because superiors‟ ratings 
were only solicited from top-tier banks. 
To ensure robustness we measure experience in three ways: years spent trading, age, and 
rank. Years spent trading is divided into three categories, with roughly equal numbers of dealers 
in each: 0-8 years, 9-14 years, and 15 or more years. Age is divided into four categories: 30 and 
under, 31-35, 36-40, and over forty. Rank is divided into three categories: Trainees and Junior 
Traders, Senior Traders, and Head Dealers/Treasurers. 
We pause briefly to describe some properties of the two overconfidence measures. In our 
data, women tend to display less overconfidence by both measures; the same can be said for 
salespersons relative to other traders. Since women are disproportionately represented among 
                                                 
11 Note that the correlation between the dealers‟ average December and average June ratios is a strong 0.79, which 
suggests there is little loss of information when combining intervals. 
12 This measure effectively assumes that superior‟s ratings are more objectively accurate than those of their subordi-
nates. Indeed, since the ratings of superiors and their subordinates are almost uncorrelated, at most one of them can 
reasonably be assumed to be correlated with “objective truth.” We choose superiors‟ ratings for this role since their 
average rating is closer to the theoretical mean of 4.0. Though this seems the best available measure of overconfi-
dence, we are aware that superiors will never be perfectly accurate in assessing their subordinates.   22 
foreign exchange salespeople, one might guess that the pattern for women explains the pattern 
for salespeople, but the differences in overconfidentce between salespeople and others appear to 
be sustained after controlling for gender. We note in passing that the influence of gender on 
overconfidence remains uncertain: Deaves et al. (2003), for example, find no influence.  
It might also be natural to assume that miscalibration and hubris are closely related. In-
deed, Gervais and Odean (2001) describe how hubris could be the source of miscalibration. 
Nonetheless, the correlation coefficient between miscalibration and hubris is an economically 
small 0.15, though statistically significant. A weak relation between these two dimensions of 
overconfidence is consistent with results from other relevant studies (Deaves et al. (2003); Ré-
gner et al. (2004); Glaser and Weber (2007)). 
Our analysis of the survival of overconfidence is organized around two testable implica-
tions of Friedman‟s famous assertion that imperfect rationality is driven out of markets (1953): 
Hypothesis 1, Absolute Rationality: Dealers with the most experience are not overconfident at 
all. Hypothesis 2, Relative Rationality: Dealers overconfidence declines with experience, so ex-
perienced dealers are less overconfident than their junior colleagues. 
A.  Absolute Rationality: Are The Most Experienced Dealers Overconfident?  
If imperfect rationality is driven out of the market, the most experienced traders will not 
be overconfident at all. Table 7, which reports the averages of our two overconfidence measures 
for dealers in different experience categories, provides no support for this hypothesis.  
In Table 7A, which focuses on miscalibration, we find that overconfidence is statistically 
significant among the most experienced dealers no matter how we measure experience. Among 
dealers with fifteen or more years of trading experience, confidence intervals are about half as 
large as they should be if dealers were well-calibrated, with t-statistic of 9.9. Confidence inter-
vals among dealers over 40 years old are 46 percent smaller than they should be, with t-statistic 
of 24.4, and among Head Traders/Treasurers they are over 60 percent too small, with t-statistic 
of 4.5.   23 
Hubris is also strong, both economically and statistically, for experienced dealers. For 
dealers with fifteen or more years of experience, hubris averages 0.65, with t-statistic 2.2. This 
represents a substantial distortion of their performance ratings, as it covers over a quarter of the 
gap between the superior‟s average performance rating for this group, which is 4.5, and the high-
est possible rating , which is seven. Average hubris is 0.46 for dealers over 40 years old, with t-
statistic 2.1, which implies that this group inflates their performance rating almost 20 percent of 
the way towards ideal performance, on average. Average hubris is 1.13 for Head Traders and 
Treasurers, which implies these individuals inflated their performance rating almost half-way to 
ideal performance. 
As discussed in Section III, the incentives to overcome miscalibration are strongest for 
proprietary traders, so this group provides a particularly strong test of whether experienced de-
clines are overconfident. However, the miscalibration and hubris measures for this group provide 
no evidence for dealer rationality. Among the most experienced proprietary traders, both miscal-
ibration and hubris are statistically and economically significant. (Note that, to conserve statisti-
cal power, we create fewer age categories when analyzing proprietary traders; we also do not use 
“rank” to measure experience since almost all proprietary traders have the rank of Senior Trader 
or higher.) 
We also examine miscalibration among dealers at top-tier banks (as noted earlier, our hu-
bris measures already apply only to top-tier banks). These dealers likely have greater influence 
over market prices than other dealers because they have larger position limits and more custom-
ers. In effect, the marginal or price-setting agents in the foreign exchange market are more likely 
to work at large banks than small banks. A comparison of Table 7D, which focuses on top-tier 
banks, and Table 7A, which considers all traders, suggests no difference between dealer miscali-
bration at top- and lower-tier banks. Our conclusion that experienced dealers are positively over-
confident is also sustained if we focus exclusively on the currencies that dealers trade most ac-
tively.
13 
                                                 
13 Results of these robustness tests are available upon request.   24 
B.  Relative Rationality: Does Overconfidence Decline With Experience? 
Even if overconfidence doesn‟t completely disappear with experience it could still be 
modrated by experience. To examine whether this actually occurs compare overconfidence 
across dealers with varying experience. Table 7A shows that miscalibration varies little with ex-
perience. When experience is measured in terms of years spent trading, measured miscalibration 
is 0.46 for the group with least experience, 0.47 for the group with intermediate experience, and 
0.50 for dealers who have been trading 15 years or longer. Even though the slight differences 
across these measures are not statistically significant, we note for later reference that the direc-
tion of change runs counter to the hypothesis that irrational traders are driven out of financial 
markets. When experience is measured by age, the miscalibration point estimates vary non-
monotonically with experience – they average 0.46 for the two youngest groups, 0.51 for traders 
in their late 30s, and then once again 0.46 for traders over forty – though these differences, too, 
are insignificant. When experience is measured by rank, miscalibration varies most widely, but 
even here it only ranges from 0.46 to 0.62. Here again, measured overconfidence is highest for 
the most experienced dealers though the differences across groups are insignificant.  
As shown in Table 7B, the hubris measures provide even less support for the hypothesis 
that overconfidence declines with experience; indeed, this evidence suggests weakly that hubris 
rises with experience. This is not entirely surprising since, as discussed in Section I, there exists 
substantial evidence for the hypothesis that overconfidence gets stronger with experience, a re-
sult that is especially strong when correct answers are not much more likely than by chance, as in 
the foreign exchange market. When experience is measured by years spent trading, average hu-
bris is 0.50 for the least experienced traders, 0.47 for traders with intermediate experience, and 
0.65 for traders with the most experience. Though this suggests that hubris rises with experience, 
the differences across groups are again insignificant. When experience is measured by age or 
rank, however, the evidence that hubris rises with experience is a bit stronger. For both these 
measures of experience, average hubris is statistically insignificant, and lowest, for the least ex-
perienced traders while it is significant for all other groups. When experience is measured by   25 
age, average hubris is only 0.23 for those in their twenties but it ranges from 0.46 to 0.64 for old-
er traders. When experience is measured by rank, average hubris is 0.41 for Trainees and Junior 
Traders, 0.45 for Senior Traders, and 1.13 for Head Traders/Treasurers. The evidence for the hy-
pothesis that hubris rises with experience is weakened, however, by the fact that differences 
across hubris across experience categories remain insignificant. 
The strongest evidence that experience and incentives fail to moderate overconfidence 
comes from a comparison of proprietary traders, as a group, with salespeople and interbank trad-
ers. As shown in the top panel of Table 7C, proprietary traders are significantly more miscali-
brated and hubristic than salespeople, though salespeople forecast less frequently and are re-
warded only indirectly for accuracy.  Among proprietary traders with different levels of experi-
ence, miscalibration and hubris averages do not vary widely across experience categories and 
differences between experience categories are insignificant. The conclusion that overconfidence 
is not moderated by experience likewise gains no support from an analysis of dealers at top-tier 
banks. 
C.  Additional Tests 
Since the results in Table 7 could conceivably be driven by a few extremely overconfi-
dent individuals, we present two additional sets of figures. These indicate that miscalibration and 
hubris are widespread. These tests, like our previous tests, provide no support for the hypothesis 
that imperfectly rationality is driven out of financial markets.  
Table 8A shows the share of dealers whose confidence intervals are too narrow, with the 
"correct" width again taken to be the width associated with the conditional volatility estimates. 
Even for the most experienced dealers, the vast majority of confidence intervals are too narrow. 
Further, the share of intervals that are too narrow is, in essence, insensitive to the dealers‟ level 
of experience. This conclusion holds for all three approaches to measuring of experience and, 
though not shown in the table, it also holds if we focus exclusively on the currencies that dealers 
most actively trade.   26 
Table 8B shows the fraction of dealers rating themselves above and below average, along 
with the fraction of dealers rated above and below average by their superiors, disaggregated ac-
cording to experience as measured by years of trading experience, age, or rank. The fraction of 
experienced dealers rating themselves above average ranges from 67 percent to 81 percent and is 
substantially above the corresponding fraction from their superiors in almost every case. For ex-
ample, 73 percent of dealers with over twenty years of experience rated themselves above aver-
age. This might seem potentially reasonable, since these dealers have clearly thrived in this mar-
ket, but according to their superiors only half of these dealers were actually above average. Thus 
the tendency to overrate one‟s-self appears to characterize even the most seasoned currency 
dealers. Further, the table provides no evidence that this tendency abates as dealers gain experi-
ence. 
 The results of this section suggest consistently that imperfect rationality is not driven out 
of currency markets. Despite many years of trading and strong incentives to accuracy, experi-
enced dealers still tend to overestimate the precision of their information and still tend to overes-
timate their own abilities. Further, these tendencies do not appear decline as dealers gain experi-
ence. 
VI.   CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
This paper tests whether overconfident traders are driven out of the foreign exchange 
market. Friedman famously claimed that imperfectly rational traders will be driven out of the 
market by trading losses (1953), a claim that has been influential because it suggests that imper-
fect rationality can be disregarded and we can reasonably assume efficient markets. Nonetheless, 
the claim has rarely, if ever, been tested. We focus on a well-documented form of imperfect ra-
tionality, overconfidence, and test its survival among the traders who set prices in the world‟s 
largest market.  
We set the stage for our analysis by providing evidence that currency dealers, like most 
people, display two types of overconfidence: they tend to overestimate the precision of their in-
formation (miscalibration) and they tend to overestimate their professional success (hubris). We   27 
then compare the overconfidence of foreign exchange dealers with various degrees of experi-
ence. The results indicate that even the most experienced dealers are strongly overconfident and 
that overconfidence is not moderated by experience or incentives. 
These conclusions hold for both types of overconfidence; they hold regardless of whether 
we measure experience by years spent trading, age, or professional rank; they hold for proprie-
tary traders, the ones with the strongest incentives to accuracy, as well as other traders; and they 
hold for the subset of our dealers who work at the most active dealing banks. The survival of 
overconfidence among influential financial-market participants with strong incentives to accura-
cy is not consistent with the assumptions of perfect rationality and efficient markets. Nonethe-
less, our results are consistent with much evidence from economics and psychology. 
Future research could constructively examine the mechanism(s) through which dealer 
overconfidence survives. Among the many possibilities worth exploring, we highlight three: 
Overconfidence, by leading others to have inflated opinions of one‟s success, might increase 
one‟s likelihood of promotion within an organization; overconfidence, by enhancing cognitive 
facility, might enhance dealers‟ ability to identify profitable trading opportunities; overconfi-
dence, by fostering persistence and a tolerance for adversity, might enable dealers to sustain a ca-
reer with such intense competition and frequent setbacks.   28 
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Appendix: "Top" and "Lower" Tier Foreign exchange Dealing Banks 
Top Tier: Leading North American foreign exchange dealing banks. The 26 banks in this catego-
ry were defined as institutions included at least one of the following lists: (i) membership in on the New 
York Foreign exchange Committee in 2001 and/or 2002; (ii) the top 10 institutions of the Best Provider of 
foreign exchange Services Overall annual ranking published by Global Investor Magazine in March 2001 
and/or March 2002; (iii) the top 10 institutions of the Global Top 50 Foreign exchange Market Compa-
nies by Estimated Market Share annual ranking published by Euromoney Magazine in May 2001; (iv) the 
top 10 institutions of the annual Best Bank Overall for foreign exchange Dealing ranking published by 
foreign exchange Week in December 2001; (v) the top 10 institutions in the Annual Ranking of Banks‟ 
foreign exchange Revenues 2001 published by foreign exchange Week in December 2001. 
North American trading floors of the resulting 26 institutions were contacted and invited to partic-
ipate in the study. Twenty-one of these trading floors agreed to participate fully, resulting in an institu-
tional participation rate of 81% of the leading market participants. Of 551 questionnaires sent to these 21 
trading floors, 326 were returned, an individual questionnaire return rate of 60%. 
Lower Tier: Other foreign exchange dealing banks in North America. These are defined as all 
other foreign exchange banking institutions in the U.S. and in Canada listed in Societe Generale's Dealer 
Directory (Nicolson 2002). Foreign exchange traders at these institutions were sent questionnaires by 
mail. Of 529 questionnaires sent to banks in this group, 90 were returned, resulting in a questionnaire re-
turn rate of 17% for this group.
14,15 
                                                 
14. The participation rate among lower tier banks is below that of the top tier banks, but still higher than the 8 per-
cent reported from a previous survey in the U.S. foreign exchange market (Cheung and Chinn, 2001) which used a 
comparable mail-out procedure. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Survey Respondents 
The table provides descriptive information concerning the 416 respondents to a June 2002 survey 
of North American currency market professionals. Note: totals do not sum to 100% for some cat-
egories because some individuals responded to multiple categories. 
Location  Product  Function 
   New York City    53%       Spot                 73%      Interbank Trader      59% 
   U.S. non-NYC     33%       Forward           33%      Salesperson              32% 
   Canada                 14%       Derivatives      23%      Proprietary Trader   20% 
       Money Market  6%   
     
Rank  Age  Currency Focus 
    Treas./Hd Trader    12%       Over 41          30%       EUR/USD              61% 
    Senior Trader         75%       36-40             27%       USD/JPY               42% 
    Junior Trader         12%       31-35             27%       USD/CAD             39% 
    Trainee                    1%       26-30             13%       GDP/USD              30% 
       Less than 25    3%       USD/CHF              20% 
         USD vs Other        20% 
         EUR/JPY               11% 
         EUR/GBP              11% 
         EUR/CHF                8% 
         EUR vs Other        10% 
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Table 2: Point Forecasts Less Accurate Than No-Change Forecast 
The table shows that exchange-rate forecasts of North American currency market professionals 
were generally less accurate than the no-change forecast, with accuracy measured as root mean 
squared error (RMSE) *100. Point forecasts for exchange rates on December 1, 2002 and June 1, 
2003 were submitted by 375 North American currency market professionals as part of a survey 
distributed in June of 2002. 
A. Proprietary Traders Only           
     Forecast for December 1            
        RMSE, No-Change (%)  1.41  2.72  1.16  1.21  1.76 
        RMSE, Prop. Traders (%)  5.06  5.42  3.17  5.09  3.74 
        t-statistic vs. No-Change  (7.21)  (3.79)  (4.11)  (4.45)  (3.16) 
    Forecast for June 1            
        RMSE, No-Change (%)  18.01  1.87  1.96  13.74  13.11 
        RMSE, Prop. Traders (%)  18.76  10.33  5.31  15.00  12.60 
       t-statistic vs. No-Change   ( 0.92)    (3.38)  (5.32)   (1.64)  (-0.76) 
    Sales and Interbank Traders           
    Forecast for December 1, RMSE         4.72   5.59    3.25    4.30    3.80 
       t-statistic vs. Prop. Traders     (0.79)  (-0.28)  (-0.32)  ( 1.27)  (-0.14) 
    Forecast for June 1, RMSE  18.84   7.12    5.05  15.03  11.07 
       t-statistic vs. Prop. Traders   (-0.09)   (1.81)    (0.43)  (-0.04)   ( 2.05) 
B. All Traders           
     Forecast for December 1            
        RMSE, No-Change (%)  1.31  3.34  1.24  1.24  2.05 
        RMSE, All Traders (%)  4.83  5.54  3.22  4.56  3.78 
        t-statistic vs. No-Change  (10.6)  (6.84)  (8.77)  (8.98)  (8.00) 
    Forecast for June 1            
       RMSE, No-Change (%)  17.70  1.89  1.25  13.37  12.37 
       RMSE, All Traders (%)  18.81  8.26  5.13  15.02  11.58 
       t-statistic vs. No-Change  (2.70)  (6.38)  (8.12)  (4.18)  (-2.70) 
C. Top Tier Banks Only (all traders) 
     Forecast for December 1            
        RMSE, No-Change (%)  1.37  3.46  1.09  1.36  1.93 
        RMSE, Top Tier (%)  4.84  5.50  3.23  4.39  3.62 
        t-statistic vs. No-Change  (8.96)  (5.94)  (8.00)  (9.95)  (10.29) 
    Forecast for June 1            
        RMSE, No-Change (%)  17.66  1.91  1.09  13.30  12.56 
        RMSE, Top Tier (%)  18.63  7.72  5.13  14.88  11.65 
        t-statistic vs. No-Change    (2.05)  (5.13)  (6.67)    (3.61)  (-2.62) 
D.  Lower Tier Banks Only (all traders) 
     Forecast for December 1, RMSE        4.77    5.68   3.20    5.12     4.30 
        t-statistic vs. Top Tier    (0.15  (-0.26)  (0.07)  (-0.90)  (-1.11) 
     Forecast for June 1, RMSE  19.41    9.92   5.14  15.51  11.33 
        t-statistic vs. Top Tier  (-0.83)  (-1.43)  (-0.02)  (-0.67)    (0.57) Table 3: Confidence Intervals are Too Narrow 
Ninety-percent confidence intervals for exchange rates on December 1, 2002 and June 1, 2003 were 
submitted by 375 North American currency market professionals in response to a survey distributed 
in June of 2002. Panel A shows the share of all confidence intervals that exclude the realized ex-
change rate. Under the null hypothesis of rationality and independence the true fraction would be ten 
percent. For all traders we have on average 323 observations (min = 300, max = 349). For proprie-
tary traders we have on average 68 observations (min. = 64, max = 71). 
Panels B and C compare the proportionate width of the confidence intervals to an objective 
econometric estimate of the proper width, specifically the ninety-percent confidence interval con-
structed from GARCH volatility estimates ending in the month each forecast was compiled. Ex-
change-rate data from Datastream. Under the null hypothesis of rationality and independence, the 
true fraction is 50 percent, so statistical significance is calculated using the binomial distribution with 
p = 0.5. Significance at the ten percent level indicated by *. Significance at the five percent level in-
dicated by **. In Panel B, statistical significance is below 0.0001 in each case. 
 
  Average  EUR  JPY  GBP  CHF  CAD 
A. Share of raw confidence intervals excluding realized exchange rates 
Proprietary traders  
    December 1 Forecast  35.2  35.2  35.7  25.4  35.9  43.9 
    June 1 Forecast  70.5  87.9  47.7  43.8  82.0  92.1 
All traders 
    December 1 Forecast  39.3  29.3  45.1  33.7  34.0  54.7 
    June 1 Forecast  75.6  94.6  48.5  45.9  93.8  95.8 
B. Percent of intervals narrower than implied by econometric estimates  
Proprietary traders 
    December 1 Forecast  96.8  98.3**  98.3**  99.4**  99.1**  88.9* 
    June 1 Forecast   99.1  99.7**  99.4**  99.4**  99.0**  97.8** 
All traders 
    December 1 Forecast  91.1  93.0**    94.3**  91.0**  96.9**  80.3** 
    June 1 Forecast   86.7  70.4**  100.0**  98.5**  89.1**  75.8** 
 
C. Top-tier banks (all traders): Percent of intervals narrower than implied by econometric estimates  
All traders at top-tier banks 
    December 1 Forecast  96.3  87.1**  98.9**  98.1**  99.2**  98.2** 
    June 1 Forecast   92.3  82.4**  98.9**  99.6**  96.0**  82.4**   38 
Table 4: Bootstrap Tests of Miscalibration 
Table shows that the tendency for currency market professionals to overestimate the precision of 
their exchange-rate forecasts is statistically significant. Ninety-percent confidence intervals for 
exchange rates on December 1, 2002 and June 1, 2003 were submitted by 375 North American 
currency market professionals in response to a survey distributed in June of 2002. The first row 
of the table shows the share of confidence intervals submitted in July 2002 that fall short of a 
GARCH-estimated true confidence interval, and the marginal significance of that share. The 
marginal significance comes from a bootstrap test of the joint null hypothesis that (1) partici-
pants' confidence interval estimates are unbiased and (2) they are uncorrelated with the true con-
fidence interval. 
  EUR  JPY  GBP  CHF  CAD 
December 1 Forecast           




















June 1 Forecast           
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Table 5: Most Traders Rate Themselves Professionally Above-Average 
The table shows that North American currency market professionals tend to rate themselves as 
"better than average." Self-assessments of personal success were submitted by 401 individuals as 
part of a survey distributed in June of 2002. Participants were asked to rate their own profession-
al success on a scale of 1 = far below average to 7 = far above average, with 4 = average. "Top 
Tier" traders worked for "Top Tier" banks, meaning banks singled out for excellent by various 
market sources (see Appendix 1 for further details). 
  All Traders  Top Tier Banks  Other Banks  
Average Self-Rating    







Share Above Average (5, 6, 7)  73.6  74.9  68.9 
Share Below Average (1, 2, 3)  5.4  4.5  8.9 
Number of Participants  401  312  90 
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Table 6: Bootstrap Tests of Overconfidence on Self-Assessments 
The table shows that the tendency of North American currency market professionals to rate 
themselves as "better than average" is statistically significantly different from perfect rationality. 
Self-assessments of personal success were submitted by 416 North American currency market 
professionals as part of a survey distributed in June of 2002. Survey participants were asked to 
rate their own professional success on a scale of 1 = far below average to 7 = far above average, 
with 4 = average. Their superiors were asked to rate them on the same scale, with respect to three 
dimensions of success: Trading Profits, Trading Potential, and Overall Contribution. 
This table presents results of a bootstrap test of the hypothesis that the participants are 
overconfident, on average, as suggested by the high share of participants rating themselves above 
average and the small share rating themselves below average. The null hypothesis is that the par-
ticipants are not overconfident. The statistical significance of the observed shares was found by 
calculating the distribution of shares that would have been observed for 1,000 sets of n traders 
had the true distribution of success ratings been represented by the ratings submitted by superi-
ors, where n is the number of individuals with a self-rating and a complete set of ratings by their 
superior within a given rank-responsibility combination. This should represent the distribution of 
these shares under the null, for that group. The table shows the observed share and its marginal 
significance. Values of 0.000 indicate that the most extreme simulated share was less extreme 
than the observed share. 
  Observed 
Share 
Bootstrapped Marginal Significance Levels 
 
Overall  
Contribution  Profitability  Trading  
Potential 
Senior Interbank Traders         
    Above Average (5, 6, 7)  77.5  0.000  0.000  0.003 
    Below Average (1, 2, 3)  5.6  0.000  0.000  0.003 
         
Senior Salespersons         
    Above Average (5, 6, 7)  76.7  0.009  0.000  0.014 
    Below Average (1, 2, 3)  5.6  0.001  0.001  0.000 
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Table 7: Overconfidence Unrelated to Experience 
The table shows average overconfidence for dealers of different levels of experience. Calibration 
is measured with respect to ninety-percent confidence intervals for exchange rates on December 
1, 2002 and June 1, 2003, submitted by 375 North American currency market professionals in re-
sponse to a survey distributed in June of 2002. Miscalibration is the average proportionate gap 
between the width of a trader‟s confidence intervals and the horizon-appropriate widths based on 
GARCH estimates of conditional volatility. For perfectly calibrated individuals, “miscalibration” 
equals zero. Hubris measures are based on assessments of the dealers‟ personal success submit-
ted. Survey participants were asked to rate their own professional success on a scale of 1 = far 
below average to 7 = far above average, with 4 = average. Their superiors were asked to rate 
them on the same scale. The hubris measure itself is the difference between the superior‟s rating 
and the individual‟s own rating. “Hubris share” represents measured hubris as a fraction of the 
gap between seven, the highest possible rating, and the superior‟s average rating for a given 
group.
16 
7A: Miscalibration, All Traders 
Experience =  
              Years Trading 
0 - 8  
Years 
9 - 14  
Years 
15 + 
Years   
Miscalibration  0.46  0.47  0.50   
   t-statistic  19.76  24.07  9.92   
   Number obs.  106  102  107   
t-statistics for differences across groups 
   0-8  yrs vs. …    -0.25  -0.79   
   9 – 14 yrs vs. …      -0.68   
         
Experience = Age  30 Years & 
Under  
31 to 35  
Years 




Miscalibration  0.46  0.46  0.51  0.46 
   t-statistic  13.03  22.66  8.97  24.42 
   Number obs.  56  96  95  103 
t-statistics for differences across groups 
   Under 30 yrs vs. …    0.07  -0.77  -0.09 
   31 – 35 yrs vs. …      -0.90  -0.24 
   36 – 40 yrs vs. …        0.80 
         







& Treasurers   
Miscalibration  0.42  0.47  0.62   
   t-statistic  11.58  37.62  4.52   
   Number obs.  49  257  38   
t-statistics for differences across groups 
    Trainee & Jr. Trader vs. …    1.41  1.43   
    Senior Trader vs. …      1.08   
         
 
 
                                                 
16 Suppose a superior rated a group 4.5 on average, in which case the gap would be 2.4 = 7 – 4.5. If measured hubris 
for that group were 0.5, then the Hubris share would be 0.5/2.5 = 0.20.    42 
Table 7B: Hubris, All Traders 
Experience =  
              Years Trading 
0 - 8  
Years 
9 - 14  
Years 
15 + 
Years   
Hubris  0.50  0.47  0.65   
   t-statistic  2.25  2.81  2.19   
   Hubris share  0.14  0.22  0.26   
   Number obs.  57  76  51   
t-statistics for differences across groups 
   0-8  yrs vs. …    0.09  -0.40   
   9 – 14 yrs vs. …      -0.51   
         
Experience = Age  30 Years & 
Under  
31 to 35  
Years 




Hubris  0.23  0.64  0.57  0.46 
   t-statistic  0.94  3.70  2.37  2.06 
   Hubris share  0.10  0.27  0.27  0.19 
   Number obs.  47  73  61  60 
t-statistics for differences across groups 
   Under 30 yrs vs. …    -1.36  -0.98  -0.69 
   31 – 35 yrs vs. …      0.24  0.64 
   36 – 40 yrs vs. …        0.33 
         










Hubris  0.41  0.45  1.13   
   t-statistic  1.52  3.72  2.06   
   Hubris share  0.15  0.18  0.45   
   Number obs.  41  183  15   
t-statistics for differences across groups 
    Trainee & Jr. Trader vs. …    -0.12  -1.17   
    Senior Trader vs. …      -1.21   
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7C: Proprietary Traders Only  
  Miscalibration    Hubris 
  Sales  Inter-
bank  Prop.    Sales  Inter-
bank  Prop. 
Overconfidence  0.42  0.49  0.54    0.16  0.57  0.92 
   t-statistic  23.39  15.06  16.43    0.81  3.68  4.58 
   Number obs.  108  174  64    72  127  39 
  t-statistics for differences across groups 
   0 - 7  yrs vs. …    -1.98  -3.35      -1.65  -2.70 
   8 – 15 yrs vs. …      -1.13        -1.35 
               
Years Trading  0 - 8  
Years 
9 - 14  
Years 
15 +  
Years    0 - 8  
Years 




Overconfidence  0.57  0.50  0.53    0.78  0.83  1.09 
   t-statistic  8.41  9.03  10.71    2.50  3.54  2.21 
   Number obs.  22  11  28    17  9  11 
t-statistics for differences across groups 
   0 - 7  yrs vs. …    0.83  0.57      -0.13  -0.53 
   8 – 15 yrs vs. …      -0.34        -0.47 
               
Age  35 Years 
& Under 
Over 35  
Years    35 Years  
& Under 
Over 35  
Years 
Overconfidence  0.55  0.53    0.94  0.90 
   t-statistic  9.56  12.97    3.42  3.02 
   Number obs.  25  38    19  20 
t-statistics for differences across groups 
   35 & Under vs. ..…    0.27      0.09 
               
 
    44 
7D: Miscalibration, Top-Tier Banks Only  
Experience =  
              Years Trading 
0 - 8  
Years 
9 - 14  
Years 
15 + 
Years   
Miscalibration  0.46  0.46  0.43   
   t-statistic  18.30  21.74  18.18   
   Number obs.  95  83  65   
t-statistics for differences across groups 
   0-8  yrs vs. …    0.04  0.96   
   9 – 14 yrs vs. …      1.01   
         
Experience = Age  30 Years & 
Under  
31 to 35  
Years 




Miscalibration  0.46  0.46  0.45  0.46 
   t-statistic  11.97  21.19  17.58  20.42 
   Number obs.  51  83  66  72 
t-statistics for differences across groups 
   Under 30 yrs vs. …    -0.08  0.26  0.05 
   31 – 35 yrs vs. …      0.46  0.18 
   36 – 40 yrs vs. …        -0.29 
         







& Treasurers   
Miscalibration  0.42  0.47  0.53   
   t-statistic  10.29  30.59  9.73   
   Number obs.  42  175  23   
t-statistics for differences across groups 
    Trainee & Jr. Trader vs. …    -1.06  -1.59   
    Senior Trader vs. …      -1.10   
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Table 8: Miscalibration High for Experienced Dealers 
Ninety-percent confidence intervals for exchange rates on December 1, 2002 and June 1, 2003 
were submitted by 375 North American currency market professionals in response to a survey 
distributed in June of 2002. Panel A shows the share of all confidence intervals that exclude the 
realized exchange rate.  
Table shows the share of dealers' confidence intervals that are narrower than the correct 
width calculated from GARCH volatility estimates. Under the null hypothesis of perfect rational-
ity one half of the confidence intervals would be narrower than the objective benchmark. Mar-
ginal significance for each of the ten currency-forecast-date pairs is evaluated using the binomial 
distribution with n = the number of forecasts for that pair and p = 0.5. The “Maximum marginal 
significance” is taken over those ten pairs; the “Number significant at 1%” the number of those 
ten pairs significant at the 1 percent level. 
Years Trading      0 - 5  
Years 
6 - 10  
Years 
11 - 15  
Years 
16 - 20  
Years 
Over 20  
Years 
  Percent 
    Too Narrow  93.2  93.3  93.1  93.6  92.5 
  Number  
    Forecasts  569  683  931  404  654 
 Max. Marg. Sig. 
        (Out of 10)  3.45E-5  2.81E-3  1.10-9  8.93-4  3.43E-4 
 Num. Sig. at 1% 
       (Out of 10)    10  10  10  10  10 
           
Age   Under 26 
Years  
26 to 30  
Years 
31 to 35  
Years 
36 to 40  
Years 
Over 40  
Years 
  Percent 
    Too Narrow  96.7  91.3  94.1  92.3  93.6 
  Number  
    Forecasts  90  403  885  883  912 
 Max. Marg. Sig. 
       (Out of 10)  7.87E-2  1.75E-3  2.28E-8  5.25E-5  2.24E-6 
 Num. Sig. at 1% 
       (Out of 10)      9  10  10  10  10 
           
Rank  Trainee 
Junior 
Trader  Senior Trader  Head Trader  
    Percent 
    Too Narrow  90.0  94.0  93.2  90.9 
  Number  
    Forecasts  40  399  2,358  373 
 Max. Marg. Sig. 
       (Out of 10)  0.50  2.78E-4  8.87E-16  1.63E-2   
 Num. Sig. at 1% 
       (Out of 10)      0  10  10  9   
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Table 9: Hubris High for Experienced Dealers 
Self-assessments were submitted by 416 North American currency market professionals as part of a survey distributed in June of 
2002. Survey participants were asked to rate their own professional success on a scale of 1 = far below average to 7 = far above aver-
age, with 4 = average. Their superiors were asked to rate them on the same scale, with respect to three dimensions of success: Overall 
Contribution, Trading Profits, and Trading Potential. Table shows superiors‟ ratings for Overall Contribution. (Results for Trading 
profits and Trading Potential are similar.) Table shows percent of dealers rating themselves above- or below-average and the percent 
of dealers rated above- or below-average by superiors. 
Years Trading  0 – 5  6 - 10   11 - 15   16 - 20   Over 20 




















      Self  60    7  76    5  80    4  73    8  73    7 
      Superiors   43  27  47  28  63  16  52  26  50  17 
                     
Number traders  ≤ 73  ≤ 94  ≤ 103  ≤ 52  ≤ 41 
                     
Age in Years   Under 26  26 to 30   31 to 35   36 to 40   Over 40  




















      Self  75    0  68    8  76    5  79   4  70    7 
      Superiors   50  40  43  19  48  17  55  20  56  19 
                     
Number traders  ≤ 12  ≤ 50  ≤ 109  ≤ 108  ≤ 119 
                     
Rank  Trainee  Junior Trader  Senior Trader  Head Trader      

















      Self  80    0  53    4  67    6  81    2   
      Superiors   75  25  35  30  63  16  44  33   
                   
Number traders  ≤ 5  ≤ 47  ≤ 103  ≤ 42   
             
 